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Abstract—  Access control is a primary consideration  when 
standing up a high-assurance, internet-scale, and web-service 
based enterprise system for information sharing,.  A 
generalized standards-based solution is presented.  Central to 
this system is a process for access control that provides the 
fine-grained authorities for use by enterprise services.  In all 
cases, the access control, rights and privileges are done by the 
web service itself, through its own Access Control Lists 
(ACLs), and are preceded by a bi-lateral authentication in both 
normal and federated service requests.  The enterprise system 
relies on a unified naming and credentialing system for identity 
management which is not dealt with in this paper due to size 
constraints.  This document provides the process by which 
access control and entities’ claims are developed at the 
enterprise level. The claims are computed using enterprise 
attributes, use cases, policy statements and other data together 
with an Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) / Policy Based 
Access Control (PBAC) engine described in this paper.  These 
claims are then placed in a Security Assertion Markup 
Language (SAML) token to be used by the web service.  The 
SAML is signed for integrity and encrypted for confidentiality.  
This is the first enterprise level scale-up that has provided a 
consistent enterprise solution to access control that has not 
used a centralized Access Control Service and relies solely on 
the  provider  service for access control and authority 
determination. 
 
Index Terms—  Access Control, Claims Based Authorization, 
SAML, Enterprise Security 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
ntities in the Enterprise environment may be active or 
passive.  Passive entities include information packages, 
static files and/or reference data structures.   Passive entities 
are the target of activities and do not initiate activities and 
cannot assume the role of requester or provider.  Active 
entities are those entities that change or modify passive 
entities, request or provide services, or participate in 
communication flows.  Active entities are users, hardware, 
and services.  All active entities in the enterprise have 
enterprise X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificates 
[6d], and their private keys are stored in tamper proof, threat 
mitigating storage.  Communication between active entities 
in the enterprise requires full bi-lateral  PKI, end-to-end 
authentication.  Active entities must be named in accordance 
with enterprise naming instruction.  Authorization in the 
operational environment is implemented by a verifiable 
access control claims-based process.   
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Claims are part of an authorization credential issued by a 
trusted Secure Token Server (STS) and signed by that entity 
to preserve integrity. A claims-based credential is sent to the 
provider in a Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) [1a] 
envelope containing a SAML token which includes issuance 
time and expiration time.  Figure 1 displays two  active 
entities performing authorization and Active Entity B 
retrieving content from a passive entity.  
  
 
Fig. 1 Communication between Entities 
II.  CLAIMS BASED ACCESS CONTROL 
For access control, the required credential is the SAML 
Token which is constructed at runtime by an STS that has 
access to Active Directory (AD) and an enterprise Attribute 
Store (EAS) as described below.  The SAML may also be 
created by a trusted federation partner in accordance with 
federation agreements.  In each case, the SAML is provided 
directly to the provider after authentication.  The provider 
verifies and validates the SAML and extracts the claims as 
described below. 
III.  TOKEN USAGE  
A request is initiated by an Active Entity for a SAML 
token to be issued for a specific service provider. The 
requester authenticates itself to the STS and based on the 
identity established during the authentication process, the 
STS obtains claims from the AD and the EAS for that 
identity.  The STS incorporates these claims in a SAML 
token. The claims include groups and roles that satisfy use 
case and policy requirements for these web services.   The 
claims can also include delegated responsibilities as describe 
below.  The STS signs the SAML credential indicating to 
active entities that the claims are from the STS. If the STS is 
on the trusted list that each service developer is provided, 
then the claims can be recognized by the service provider.  
The service provider verifies and validates the SAML token.   
The claims included in the SAML token can be used to 
define the scope of the access which is defined in the use 
case for the service. 
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The primary method for presenting access control claims 
is the SAML token.  The SAML tokens are issued by the 
STS on a per invocation basis.  SAML tokens contain claims 
asserting attributes, membership in groups and roles and 
extended claims that include authorized and approved 
delegated authorities.  SAML token format is based on the 
current SAML standard [2e].   The use of SAML Tokens 
follows the WS-Security (WSS) framework for web service 
access using SOAP envelopes.  The enterprise uses the WS-
Security SAML Binding package.[2d]  The SAML token is 
included in a SOAP message request. The SAML token is 
signed using the XML Signature standard  [1d]  and the 
contents protected using the XML Encryption standard [1c].   
Table 1 describes the contents common to enterprise SAML 
assertions.  While other information is included in the 
SAML standard (such as authentication data), only the 
information in Table 1 is used in the enterprise. 
 
Table 1 SAML Requirements 
  Field  Required 
Content  Notes 
SAML: Assertion 
 Version ID  Version 2.0   Required 
 ID  (Unique 
value)  Required 
 
Issue 
Instant  Timestamp  Required  
 Issuer  (content)  Required 
 Signature  (content)  Required 
 Subject  (content)  Required - Must contain the X.509 
Distinguished Name  
SAML: Attribute Statement 
 Subject  Common 
Name  For identification in log files 
 
Claims 
(Attributes, 
Groups and 
Roles) 
(content) 
Claims may include extended claims 
for delegation and will be pruned for 
least privilege when appropriate 
SAML: Conditions 
 NotBefore  (content)  Timestamp – minutes 
 NotAfter  (content)  Timestamp + minutes 
STS Signature 
B.  Access Control is Implemented in Every Web Service  
Upon receipt of the SAML Token, the service identifies 
the signer of the token and extracts the signer’s public key. 
If the public key is in the local security store, the signer is 
recognized. 
• If the signer is recognized, the service validates the 
SAML token (signature validity, validity period, 
revocation status). If all checks are successful, the 
validation is successful; otherwise an authorization fail 
message is sent.  
• If the signer is not recognized, the SAML token is sent 
to the Federation STS for possible federation resolution.  
The Federation STS returns either a new SAML token 
that it has signed (start over again) or an authorization 
failure message.   
Access  is granted when a requester presents a SAML 
token with an appropriate set of authorization claims to a 
service.  
IV.  ACCESS CONTROL DECISION 
The authorization code in each service incorporates a 
claims-based process that validates access based on match 
between the service ACLs and the claims presented for 
successful authorization. 
A.  Authorization Implementation  
The following steps are used to determine the requesters’ 
access to a web service. 
1. SAML token validation (see above). 
2. Extract the group and role claims of the requester from 
the SAML token  
3. Compared one by one the claims from the SAML token 
to elements in the Access Control List (ACL).  A match 
allows access to the service.  Lack of a match is an 
authorization failure. 
If authorization fails, an error message is returned to the 
requester (“Web Service Issue.  Please try again.  If 
problems persist contact help desk.  Code ####” – where 
#### is a session attribute for help desk use) 
B.  Security Flows in the Environment 
The security model implemented as part of the enterprise 
implementation requires PKI based certificates of active 
entities and relies on details of claims to be incorporated in 
SAML token assertions to support authorization decisions 
by services.   
Each web service must be registered in the EAS with a set 
of use cases.  These use cases are used by the EAS in 
computing claims and these claims are stored in the EAS 
and made available to the STS.  Further, a list of Trusted 
STSs is created in a store on each instance of an STS that 
will act as a federation server.  Figure 2 shows the overall 
flow in the enterprise.    
The EAS is described in detail in section VI.  The claims 
may be extended for delegation. 
C.  Trusted Security Token Service Store 
Federation is the recognition of entities that are 
certificated and provide claims from domains that are not 
recognized by the service.  The web service in the enterprise 
has a limited number of recognized keys stored in the 
security related file.   
 
Federation applies to any unrecognized signature in the 
SAML token, whether it is enterprise or not.  The federation 
may be as complicated as coalition partners, or as simple as 
requests from other enterprise domains.  The security model 
implemented as part of the enterprise  implementation 
requires PKI based certificates of active entities and relies 
on details of claims to be incorporated in SAML token 
assertions to support authorization decisions.  Further, a list 
of Trusted STSs is created in a store that is collocated with 
the STS.   
This store supports the  federation activity.  In order to 
resolve the federation issues, the STS has available  the 
following information: 
•  Public keys of federated security token servers for 
resolving signatures in SAML tokens. 
o  Recognition of a signature results in an attempted 
reissuance of the SAML token as outlined below. 
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SAML and prompts an invalid SAML return which 
causes an authorization failure. 
 
The following data is available for each such recognized 
federated security token server: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A set of identity-mapping tuples with the form 
identity1, intentity2 where * in Table 2 indicates no 
further remapping required.  For simple federation, 
where requests are across enterprise  domains, this 
mapping is “no change”, and the names are in the 
appropriate form already. A null mapping on an 
identity, upon execution, invalidates the SAML and 
prompts an invalid SAML return which causes an 
authorization failure. 
 A set of mapping n-tuples of the form claim a, claim b 
where * in Table 2 indicates no further remapping 
required.  For simple federation, where requests are 
across  enterprise  domains, this mapping is not 
required, and the claims are in the appropriate form 
already. 
 Mappings may include Boolean operations and may 
map to multiple alternatives.  Boolean operations are 
not acceptable on the “map to” side.  The mappings 
depend upon the federation agreement. 
 In all mappings, “null” and “no change” mappings are 
acceptable.  Null removes the claim or identity, while 
no change leaves the original claim or identity.  
 An identity mapping invalidates the Holder Of Key 
(HOK)  on the reissued SAML token.  This step is 
skipped in the verification process.
1   
 The claims that are being mapped must match claims 
from sources on both sides: 
• Claims in the federation partner SAML must match the 
federation agreement exactly. 
• Claims in the re-issued enterprise SAML must match 
enterprise claims for the target service(s). 
 Identities and claims are added to the federation store 
after an amendment to the federation agreement. 
                                                 
1 HOK is the binding between the authentication and the authorization.   
Mapping identities denies this binding and should only be done after 
careful consideration. 
 Policy changes for individuals or accesses 
are implemented by a “null” mapping so that 
the re-issued SAML eliminates the claims. 
 Revocation of a federation agreement is 
accomplished by removing the federation 
partner from the trusted STS data store. 
The basic information is shown in the 
following table: 
D.  Elements of Federated 
Communication [18] 
Federated communications must meet all of 
the enterprise requirements, including: 
  Naming  and X.509 PKI certificates,  
  Certificates issued by a  recognized 
certificate issuer,  
  Valid dates and not revoked,  
  TLS mutual authentication, and  
  SAML tokens from designated 
authorized STSs that meet all of the above 
requirements. 
 
Table 2 Federation Data Requirements 
Trusted STS Data Store 
  Original 
SAML 
Re-issued 
SAML   
Enterprise STS 1  Enterprise STS Public Key 
These STS 
signatures 
will be 
recognized 
on SAML 
tokens 
Identity Mapping Block  *  * 
Claim Mapping Block  *  * 
Enterprise STS 2  Enterprise STS Public Key 
Identity Mapping Block  *  * 
Claim Mapping Block  *  * 
End Enterprise STS 
Federation Partner 1  Federation Public Key 
Each 
Federation 
partner will 
have its own 
mapping 
requirements 
– in general 
federation 
partners are 
not provided 
actual ACL 
claims for 
authorization
. 
Identity Mapping Block 
Identity 1  Identity 2 
Identity A  Identity B 
Identity Q  Identity B 
Identity r  No change 
Identity s  No change 
…  … 
No Further Identities 
accepted  
*  * 
Claim Mapping Block 
Claim 1 and 
Claim q  Claim 2 
Claim A  Null 
Claim n  Claim z, Claim 
q 
Claim y and 
not Claim r  Claim 2 
…  … 
*  * 
End Federation Partner 1 
Federation Partner 2  Federation Public Key  Each 
Federation 
partner will 
have its own 
mapping 
requirements 
– in general 
federation 
partners are 
not provided 
actual ACL 
claims for 
authorization
. 
Identity Mapping Block 
Identity x  Identity y 
Identity Q  Identity R 
…  … 
All other identities accepted 
and  not changed 
*  * 
Claim Mapping Block 
Claim n  Claim m 
Claim o  Claim p 
…  … 
*  * 
End Federation Partner 2 
End Federation Partners 
Fig. 2 General Flows during a User Session 
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Claims or identities are translated as indicated in the 
federation agreement.  The STS store provides a record of 
necessary translations and performs these translations prior 
to the re-issuance of SAML tokens.  For simple federation, 
where requests are across enterprise  domains, there is no 
mapping, as the claims or identities are in the appropriate 
form already.   
V.  ACCESS CONTROL LIST (ACL) STORE 
Each web service is provisioned with an ACL.  ACLs are 
developed to permit claim holders access and privilege with 
a specific web service.  They evolve over time and many 
organizations have input.  The initial ACLs are specified by 
the organization that is the owner of the information.  In 
order to make a comprehensive process for access claims, 
the conditions and rationale are stored in use cases.  Use 
cases are the collection of attributes, roles and policies that 
provide a basis for service use and include access, 
authorities such as  read/modify/write/delete, sharing 
restrictions and other permissions.  Each set of factors 
represent a set of capabilities to be applied to a class of 
users.  The name of the use case corresponds to one element 
of the ACL.  The designation of an assignment to a job class 
with certain roles is sufficient in many cases.  ACLs are 
stored in the EAS.  The use cases are stored with other 
information in the service registration process describe the 
next section on the trusted attribute store.  Table 3 provides 
the data elements for this area. 
 
Table 3 Access Control Data 
Data Element  Description   Comments 
Claim 1  allows access  allow  authorization 
Claim 2  allows access  allow  authorization 
…  up to 512 attributes  allow  authorization 
Claim a  denies access  deny authorization 
Claim b  denies access  deny authorization 
…  up to 512 attributes  deny authorization 
 
The web service contains an administrative interface to 
the service for maintenance of this data.  The administrator 
is responsible for providing this file, together with 
Distinguished Names, X.509 certificates, use cases, Web 
Service Description Language (WSDL)s, XML Schema 
Description (XSD)s and other registration data in a 
separately stored media package that is electronically signed 
by the administrator.  
VI.  TRUSTED ATTRIBUTE STORE 
The Enterprise Attribute Store (EAS) is the data 
repository of information that is used for authorization 
claims.  It must gather data, compute claims, provide for 
delegation and provide claims information about entities to 
trusted and authorized requesters.  In doing this it must meet 
all enterprise security requirements and processes. 
A.  Data Gathering 
The EAS consists of multiple sets of information. It 
contains: 
1. User attributes imported through guards from 
authoritative sources to the EAS. 
a.  User information as to rank, job class assignment, 
training, assigned roles, and other material such as 
citizenship, birth date, clearance information, etc.  
This data is contained in several ADSs and is 
updated frequently.  An agent triggers the import 
on demand, periodically, or when updates are made 
to the ADS. 
b.  Enterprise Organizational structure – updated less 
frequently, but contains a definition of job classes 
in terms of roles and authorities.  An agent triggers 
the import which occurs periodically, or when 
updates are made to the ADS. 
2. A web service registry containing Distinguished Names, 
X.509 certificates, WSDLs XSDs, ACLs, use cases and 
other web service base information.  These are imported 
from physical storage media provided by the web service 
administrator. The EAS administrator develops the rules 
for claim mappings and supplies them to the 
PBAC/ABAC Engine (see below) through a secure 
administrator interface. 
3. A PBAC/ABAC Engine -  a software service that 
examines the attributes of an active entity, use case 
information of a web service and enterprise policy into 
claims for use in SAML tokens.   
4. Claims for each active entity based upon the 
PBAC/ABAC Engine. 
5. Extended claims based on delegation. 
6. A trusted STS store, which is replaced each time an 
enterprise STS is added or replaced.  This store is used to 
validate STS requests through the STS interface.  The 
input is electronically signed by the STS administrator.  
These are imported from physical storage media, by the 
EAS administrator through a secure administrator 
interface. 
7. Additional inputs that may be required by policy inputs 
to the PBAC/ABAC Engine -  these inputs need 
electronic signatures for action.  These are imported from 
either physical or electronic storage media, by the 
administrator of the EAS through a special administrator 
interface.  An example would be restricted access on 
certain days of the week to certain services needed for 
senior level reporting.  This policy rule would require a 
trusted time input. 
The data gathering is shown in Figure 3.  
Fig. 3 Enterprise Attribute Store – Data Gathering 
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B.  EAS Governance and Claims Computation 
The following steps are used to create an authorization 
process: 
1. A change in Claims mapping is generated. 
•  New service registration, providing use cases and 
ACLs. 
•  A Policy change is forwarded to the configuration 
manager. 
2. The EAS Configuration Manager maps these into rules 
for computing claims.  He either does this manually or 
with the assistance of tools.  The new rules are uploaded 
to the PBAC/ABAC Engine. 
3. The Claims are computed and added to the claims store. 
•  Roles, groups and claims are added to each active 
entity. 
•  Expiration of appointments and/or reassignment of the 
individuals or any change of any attribute used in the 
claims process will require re-computing of claims for 
those active entities. 
•  Changes in policy will require re-computing of claims. 
•  Claims are generally approved for accessing individual 
services as needed to complete the service request.   
However, access requirements may change over time 
and any change to ACLs or use cases will require re-
computing of claims. 
4. When the requester does a Request for SAML Token 
(RST), the STS pulls the claims from the attribute store 
for the individual, places them in the SAML. 
5. After authentication, the Web-application or Service 
parses the SAML retrieves the claims (roles and groups), 
compares these to the stored ACLs, and if a match is 
found, that person is allowed to establish a session with 
the Web-application or Service. 
6. The attribute store grows and is extended as services 
and users are added.  
A.  Providing for Delegation 
Delegation is the process by which Active Entity A can 
make a claim that normally is owned by Active Entity 
B.  If the entity is a person, then delegation provides the 
claims that a user (Active Entity A) has been issued to a 
second user (Active Entity B) for the purpose of the 
second user making claims.  The delegation service 
is not described in this paper due to space 
constraints. 
B.  Providing Claims 
Claims are provided through an export 
interface which is restricted to a set of 
enterprise STSs, Web Services that 
provide web service links to the user and 
applications which require claims 
information.  The process is shown in 
Figure 4.  
VII.  Trusted Security Token Server 
An STS is a software service that meets 
the requirements listed below.  Where 
specific requirements are to be met by the 
underlying software operating system and its 
hardware, these dependencies are 
documented and provided with the software.  
Security Token Service(s) (STS)s are established throughout 
the enterprise to issue SAML  tokens to requesters as 
necessary to support authorization  to SAML enabled 
services.  SAML enabled services within the enterprise 
supports direct PKI-based user authentication.  Transport 
Layer Security (TLS) is required for connections to the STS 
to provide confidentiality, preventing token capture or 
authentication replay attacks.  The STS  accepts requests 
from authenticated local requestors for SAML services.   
The STS generates SAML tokens for the local requestor 
by communicating with the EAS and placing the requestor’s 
claims in the SAML attributes section of the SAML token.  
The STS reduces these claims to the appropriate set of 
claims that can be used by the target application.  The STS 
issues a SAML token that is digitally signed and includes an 
attribute  statement (an attribute statement includes claims 
needed for access control).  The STS accepts SAML tokens 
from foreign requesters, in accordance with defined 
federation agreements.  The STS provides for the mapping 
of identities and claims when federation is required.  The 
STS is an enterprise trusted software service and meets trust 
requirements including software vulnerability analyses and 
code protection.   The STS has at least three interfaces as 
shown in Figure 5.  
Interface 1.  WS-Trust interface to accept Request for 
SAML Tokens.  This (or a separate interface configured 
for this purpose [Alternate Interface]) is mediated to 
accept WS-Trust over HTTPS for web browser usage.  
This is used to request SAML tokens that contain the 
claims of the requester.  In the case of HTTPS mediated 
requests the SAML is returned through the browser to 
the target provider.  In the case of non-mediated 
requests, the SAML is returned to the requester.  
Interface 2.  WS-Federation interface to accept SAML 
tokens, test them against federation files and either return 
a re-issued SAML token or a message indicating failed 
authorization.  This interface is used to initiate federation 
when the issuer of the SAML token is not recognized.  
The request includes the SAML token in question which 
is then checked against a federation list.  If it is found to 
Fig. 4 Access to EAS and Delegation 
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the STS with any mappings required by federation.  If 
the STS does not recognize the signature, then a failed 
authorization message is returned.  
Interface 3.  HTTPS interface for administration. 
 
Fig. 5 STS Interfaces 
VIII.  SUMMARY 
We have presented an enterprise level solution that has 
provided a consistent enterprise solution to access control.  
The solution is characterized by standards-based, local 
access control and authority decisions within the web-
service.  Many aspects of this architecture have been piloted 
and a full scale operational stand-up is currently in process. 
It is anticipated that this architecture will be more fully 
integrated at the enterprise level, more easily extended to 
future service offerings, and fully compatible with federated 
activities while maintaining a high assurance posture.  To 
our knowledge, this is the first enterprise solution that does 
not use centralized access and policy enforcement points.   
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